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The Right to Counsel
A Foreword
William 0. Douglas*
The sixth amendment's provision that in all criminal prosecu-
tions the accused shall enjoy the right "to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence" is the beginning of our problem. Some
still maintain that that provision has the implied limitation, "if
the defendant is rich enough to hire one." In federal proceedings,
of course, the right to counsel is a right to counsel for all, includ-
ing indigents.1 It is a right to counsel at every stage of the pro-
ceeding, on appeal as well as in the trial court.2 But a defend-
ants federal right to counsel in state criminal prosecutions is less
secure. The relationship of the sixth amendment to the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment has been much litigated, as
the landmark decisions from Powell v. Alabama3 to McNeal v.
Culve4 indicate.
The refusal to recognize the right of counsel in every criminal
case has long seemed to me to be a denial of the equal protection
of the law. Certainly he who has a long purse will always have a
lawyer, while the indigent will be without one. I know of no more
invidious discrimination based on poverty. And the old saying that
he who represents himself in litigation has a fool for a client is as
applicable to the indigents as to others. It would be unfair, how-
ever, to the proud traditions which many of the states have estab-
lished in this regard not to recognize that the right of counsel for
all is assured in felony cases in a large majority of our states.'
In many states this right is not limited to those charged with
felonies, but is extended "in all cases." These are developments
of which those states may be justly proud, for as Mr. Justice Bren-
nan has said in his recent James Madison Lecture at New York
University Law Center, The Bill of Rights and the States: "Without
the help of a lawyer all the other safeguards of a fair trial may
be empty."
*Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court.
1. FED. R. Cium. P. 44.
2. Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674 (1957); Johnson v. United States,
352 U.S. 565 (1957).
3. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
4. 365 U.S. 109 (1961).
5. See McNeal v. Culver, supra note 4, at 119-22 (appendix to concur-
ring opinion).
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But the need for the advice and guidance of counsel is not lim-
ited to formal courtroom proceedings. The need for counsel exists
wherever the procedural and substantive rights of a person may
fail to be asserted fully because of his ignorance or inexperience.
It exists wherever "that which is simple, orderly and necessary to
the lawyer, to the untrained layman may appear intricate, complex
and mysterious."6 It also exists wherever officialdom seeks to take
advantage of its own power or the weakness of the individual.
Police interrogation is a very relevant example of where this latter
need arises, although the federal law here is still halting or yet
unborn. 7
I often think that a person has to go to a communist country
or see some other totalitarian regime in operation fully to appreci-
ate the role counsel can perform. Those who live where the police
are supreme may appreciate protective procedural devices more
than those who live in the environment of freedom, where they
themselves never feel the fierce impact of criminal law. Perhaps
that is the reason why the Bar of Soviet Russia proposed an amend-
ment to the Soviet criminal code which would recognize the right
of a person to a lawyer from the time of his arrest. The recom-
mendation is one that many thoughtful Americans have believed
appropriate, even in a country where the police are not supreme.
The reaction of the Supreme Soviet to the proposal of the Rus-
sian Bar was decisive. They not only rejected the proposal, but
they increased the period during which a person could be held
incommunicado. Up to December, 1958, that period had extended
for 63 days, at the end of which a person detained was to be
brought to trial. Under the 1958 revised code that period was ex-
tended to a possible six months.
Right of counsel at the moment of arrest is a proposal that
would be opposed by police everywhere. It takes an advantage from
them-the leverage of detention incommunicado during which a
confession is expected. India is the only nation that has faced the
problem squarely.8 Statements to a policeman are inadmissible at
an Indian trial. Only confessions to a magistrate can be introduced
in evidence.
When we drop to the level of the police courts and face the
mounting load of vagrancy cases, the problem becomes even more
acute.' Few are bold enough to suggest that these pieces of human
6. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
7. Compare Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958) and Cicenia v.
LaGay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958), with Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315,
324 (Douglas, J., concurring), 326 (Stewart, J., concurring) (1959).
8. DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES 372 (1956).
9. See Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J. 1
(1960).
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jetsam (who are largely victims of poverty and unemployment)
are entitled to counsel. Yet the need may be as great there as in
the other cases."0 The need for the guiding hand of counsel injuvenile cases, in congressional hearings, during administrative
investigations or inquiries," or in civil proceedings also raises
large problems in our complex society.
The Legal Aid Society, the New Jersey assignment system, the
public defender-these are alternative methods of supplying coun-
sel to those in need and without funds. Our medical clinics that
offer service at the lowest level are advanced over our legal clinics.
Yet the ferment at the Bar indicates our resolution to make the
American legal system the shining example of equal justice under
law.
10. See Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960); Edelman
v. California, 344 U.S. 357 (1953); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160
(1941).
11. See In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957).

